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Abstract
It has been observed that in single voting unanimity can rarely be reached. In many
situations, however, members may not be aware that their preferences as expressed by
their votes may contain room for compromise. This paper proposes a consensus-seeking
methodology – the Negotiable Alternatives Identifier (NAI) – that searches for such a
compromise. Starting with individual cardinal preferences on alternatives, NAI classifies
alternatives into three classes of preferences: the most preferred, the less preferred and
the least preferred. Within each class, relatively small dierences in preferences among
alternatives may make it reasonable for a decision maker to consider them inter-
changeable. As a result of this flexibility, a collective solution acceptable to all decision
makers can be generated. In this paper we provide some theorems and their proofs to
address the extreme conditions of the proposed heuristic. Also we provide an example to
illustrate how to use the proposed heuristic to solve a real-world problem. Ó 1999
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1. Introduction
It is well known that modeling for group decision making is much more
complex than that for individual decision making. As quoted from Hwang and
Lin (1987):
Moving from a single decision maker to a multiple decision maker setting
introduces a great deal of complexity into the analysis. The problem is no
longer the selection of the most preferred alternative among the nondom-
inated solutions according to one individual’s (single decision maker’s)
preference structure. The analysis must be extended to account for the
conflicts among dierent interest groups who have dierent objectives,
goals, criteria, and so on.
In eect, while the analysis of individual decision making benefits from a
wide range of modeling tools ranging from descriptive statistics to sophisti-
cated analytical algorithms, models that deal with group problem solving are
often limited to the techniques of aggregation of preferences (e.g., Black, 1958;
Borda, 1981; Cook and Seiford, 1978) and are faced with subtle interpersonal
issues (Lax and Sebenius, 1986).
Thanks to their simple concepts and mechanisms, these techniques of ag-
gregation of preferences have proven popular in many real life group decision-
making situations (Hwang and Lin, 1987), for example, the selection of tra-
jectories for the Mariner Jupiter/Saturn 1977 project. The decision rules were
collective choice which were based on the sum of ordinal rankings and cardinal
utility function values. However, such results in proposed compromise may or
may not be acceptable to all the group members (Anscombe, 1976). Com-
promise has a role to play, of course. It should be embedded in a process of
consensus seeking – information exchange, problem adaptation and restruc-
turing seeking – if possible, to move to a single solution acceptable to all group
members (Shakun, 1988 and 1991).
Recently, more research works in the development of new negotiation
models or frameworks have been reported. For example, Holsapple et al.
(1996) have summarized the negotiation theories and the parametric theory
to support development of future negotiation support systems. Mumpower
and Rohrbaugh (1996) proposed the Analytical Mediation Approach, which
suggests hiring of an unbiased third party to assist the disputants to reach a
mutually satisfactory agreement in resources allocation. Pinson and Mor-
aitis (1996) applied the distributed artificial intelligence (DAI) and multi-
agent theory to propose a general framework to support the development
of intelligent distributed strategic decision making systems. Reeves and
Bordetski (1995) have developed an interactive framework to support the
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identification of preferred range for the value of each objective of each
decision maker. With such framework, decision makers are asked to specify
their aspiration and reservation levels to establish the preferred ranges,
group and individual solutions are, therefore, generated as a function of
these ranges.
However, most of the above approaches cannot guarantee that a solution
can be reached in one round of negotiation. For example, the approach pro-
posed by Reeves and Bordetski (1995) requires the decision makers to specify
their aspiration and reservation levels to develop the preferred ranges. How-
ever, decision makers always had diculty in accurately specifying such values
in the first trial. Therefore, multiple rounds of adjustment is inevitable. As
consensus can rarely be reached in the first round of negotiation, this paper,
therefore, proposes a consensus-seeking methodology called the Negotiable
Alternatives Identifier (NAI) which entails multiple rounds of group consid-
eration.
NAI is a formalized methodology based on an intuitive procedure observed
in negotiations. This procedure typically is described as follows: ‘‘We group
members failed to find a consensus. However, if some of us are willing to accept
solutions other than our first choice, but which are not that far dierent
preference-wise from the first choice, then we may find a common solution all
of us can find acceptable’’.
The NAI algorithm, especially with its expansion/contraction/intersection
concept, provides an aggregation approach which is less rigid yet intuitive
enough for the decision makers to search for, and agree upon, a group solu-
tion. NAI first seeks to locate candidates for compromise, and next searches for
alternatives which can be accepted by all the group members. The major dif-
ference between NAI and other approaches (e.g., Anscombe, 1976; Borda,
1981; Cook and Seiford, 1978) is that in most cases it requires only one round
of negotiation to generate a solution.
Normally, a group’s satisfaction decreases and the costs increase if longer
meeting or more rounds of negotiations are required (Hackman and Kaplan,
1974). Also, the preferences that each member applied in the first round of
negotiation reflected what he or she believed the most appropriate. Therefore,
it is recommendable not to hold another round of negotiation or to adjust the
preferences. But, based on the original preferences to identify an alternative
which is not too far from every one’s first choice.
The concepts underlying the NAI methodology are discussed in Section 2.
Section 3 describes the NAI methodology and its mathematical models. In
Section 4, we further investigate the search procedures by providing some
theorems and their proofs to discuss the extreme conditions of NAI heuris-
tics. An example adapted from a real life decision situation illustrating the
proposed methodology is provided in Section 5. Section 6 presents concluding
remarks.
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2. Consensus-seeking: Problem definition and basic concepts
2.1. Definition of the problem
(1) All participants of the group problem solving share the same set of ex-
haustive and mutually exclusive alternatives, where n is the number of alter-
natives, and d the number of decision makers participating in the group
problem-solving.
(2) Prior to the group decision making process, each decision maker or
group member i has performed his/her own assessment of preferences. For
example, the decision maker can use an additive utility method (Fishburn,
1974a, b) or the Analytic Hierarchy Process (Saaty, 1980) to obtain utilities.
The output of such analysis is a vector of normalized cardinal preferences on
n alternatives ri  rij, where rij P 0 for i  1; . . . ; d, j  1; . . . ; n, andPn
j1 rij  1.
(3) Furthermore, the vector of ranking, ri, is sorted according to an order of
decreasing importance. This notion of preference corresponds to a complete
asymmetry preorder. In other words, ri;1 represents the relative preference of
the most preferred alternative and ri;n the relative preference of the least pre-
ferred alternative.
(4) Given the vector ri, Ri;s can be defined as the cumulative preference that a






Starting with individual and cardinal rankings of alternatives, the proposed
methodology is motivated by the following observations. First, the possibility
of reaching consensus can be improved if the decision makers exhibit some
flexibility regarding their individual assessment of preferences. Second, they
should be able to identify exchangeable or negotiable alternatives.
Bui and Shakun (1989) propose a methodology that attempts to help the
decision makers who exhibit flexibility in the assessment of preferences. It is
based on the observations that the determination of the cardinal ranking of a
set of alternatives is influenced by two factors:
1. The total number of alternatives being evaluated aects the intensity of
preferences. Often, the greater the number of alternatives, the weaker the rel-
ative importance of the alternatives. That is, it is more dicult to tell which one
is more important than the other.
2. The distribution of marginal dierence among the alternatives is rarely
uniform. For example, some alternatives share close evaluation (e.g., A and B
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with respective scores of 0.33 and 0.32); while others score significant marginal
dierence (e.g., C and D with 0.25 and 0.11, respectively).
NAI is characterized by a triplet of operations: expansion, contraction, and
interaction. The objective of the first operation is to assess individual prefer-
ences by locating possible areas of compromise. In eect, when a decision-
maker ranks his preferences, the order is constantly subject to re-evaluation.
He logically chooses the alternative that is ranked first; however, he may
consider the others depending on their relative distances from the first.
The methodology proposed in this paper groups ranked alternatives into
three classes of preferences: the most preferred, the less preferred, and the least
preferred sets. Within each class, negligible dierences in preferences among
alternatives would increase the confidence of the decision makers not to dis-
criminate among them. As a consequence, it would make it easier for the de-
cision makers to trade them interchangeably. In other words, grouping
alternatives that share close evaluation corresponds to expanding the prefer-
ence space(s) of the decision maker from one best alternative to a set of more or
less equally preferred alternatives.
The contraction operation constitutes the second phase of the NAI algo-
rithm. Given a subset of comparatively satisfactory alternatives obtained from
the expansion mapping, the second operation attempts to identify those that
might exhibit a stronger preferential distribution than others. Thus, if among
the preferred alternatives, there still remains an unequal distribution of pref-
erences, the NAI algorithm provides an indicator that distinguishes the most
preferred alternatives from the preferred ones.
The third and the last step is the intersection operation. It derives a col-
lective solution(s) that is (are), in principle, acceptable to all group members.
Consensus is reached when there is at least one alternative that appears in every
group member’s subset of the most preferred alternatives. As a result, a col-
lective solution is one that is essentially acceptable to all can be suggested.
Conversely, if the intersection operation fails to identify a collective solution,
this could be seen as an indicator suggesting that some other form of consensus
seeking or compromise should be tried (Shakun, 1991; Zarhman, 1994).
3. Heuristics for consensus seeking
Although comprehensive, Bui and Shakun’s (Bui and Shakun, 1989) work
lacks a complete formalism that allows exploration of all properties of the NAI
concept.
3.1. NAI heuristic
As discussed earlier, the distribution of preferences among alternatives
reflects the extent to which alternatives are related to each other. With
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alternatives ranked by cardinal preferences, the Structural Index of Preferences
of the Subset consisting of the first j alternatives, SIij can be defined as follows.
For a decision maker i,
SIij  1j
 















  ; 4
where j  2; . . . ; n; and k  1; . . . ; jÿ 1 is a summation index. Here we assume
that the denominator diers from zero. Otherwise we define Mijk  1.
In other words, Mijk is the ratio between the cumulative preference per al-
ternative assigned to better alternatives and that of the residual alternatives.
M ji is an average value of Mijk. The structural index SIij puts this average M
j
i
on a per alternative basis. The value of SIij is a function of the number of
alternatives j, as well as the distribution of the decision maker’s preferences rij.
Theoretically, SIij varies between 1=j (i.e., situation in which the decision
maker is completely indierent with regard to alternatives) and 1 (i.e., the
maximum of ‘‘disequilibrium’’ among distribution of preferences). A detailed
proof is given in Section 4. Furthermore, one might argue that the closer the
value of SIij to 1=j the easier for the decision maker to negotiate with other
members of the group. Conversely, the higher the value of SIij, the smaller the
degree of flexibility in negotiation.
Phase 1: The expansion operation. Given a set of n ranked alternatives, the
subset of preferred alternatives can be defined as the one comprising the top
alternatives, say pi , that are clearly more preferred than the other alternatives,
i.e. nÿ pi . The identification of the number of preferred alternatives pi as well
as the rationale of the approach are described below:
(1) Define nÿ 1 subsets of alternatives: The first subset is composed of the
first two alternatives (j  2). The second is composed of the first three alter-
natives j  3, etc. And the nÿ 1th subset is the entire set itself j  n.
(2) For each subset of j alternatives, compute its structural index of pref-
erences, SIij, where j  2; . . . ; n.
(3) The subset containing the preferred alternatives is the one that has the
lowest SIij
SIi;pi  minfSIijg; 5
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where pi represents the first p

i alternatives that form the subset of the preferred
alternatives 26 pi 6 n. In the case of multiple optimum, the largest among
the optimal p values is selected.
The rationale of using the smallest SIij as the cut-o point can be intuitively
justified by the observation that the lower the value of SIij the more uniform
the distribution of preferences among alternatives. Thus, by choosing pi that
has the minimum value of SIij as the cut-o point is that the decision maker i
has more or less evenly distributed his preferences among the pi alternatives. In
other words, numerical dierences between pi alternatives are not significant
enough to assert that none of the alternatives is clearly worse than another to
the extent that it should be discarded.
From a group problem solving point of view, a higher SIi;pi value indicates
that the decision maker i has a strong and clear choice. As a consequence, there
may be little room left for concession. On the other hand, a SIi;pi with a small
value suggests that the decision maker i would exhibit some indierence to the
alternatives, and as a consequence, any of these could be acceptable.
Phase 2: The contraction operation. The idea here is to find out which subset
of the preferred set constitutes the most preferred subset. Given pi preferred
alternatives the identification of a second cut-o can be done by applying the
following steps:
(1) Define pi ÿ 1 subsets of alternatives in a bottom-up manner: The first
bottom subset is composed by the pi minus the top one. The second subset is
composed by pi alternatives minus the first two top alternatives; etc. And the
pi ÿ 1th bottom subset contains only one alternative, the one just above the
cut-o point for the preferred set.
(2) Compute the arithmetic mean rÿi;m of the cardinal preferences of each
subset m, where m  1; . . . ; pi ÿ 1 corresponds respectively to the first to the
pi ÿ 1th bottom subset as defined in step (1).






where ri;m is the cardinal preference for alternative m, the last top alternative
defining a cut-o point separating the bottom subset from the alternatives
above. Note that the cardinal preferences of the alternatives in the preferred
set, pi , are renormalized so that their sum equals one.
(4) Choose the second cut-o point mi by maximizing the Ci;m preference
ratio, i.e., Max fCi;mg for m  1; . . . ; pi ÿ 1. The rationale for this is as fol-
lows. If Ci;mi is large, then there is a big relative drop between the preference
value ri;mi of the alternative just above the cut-o point compared to the av-
erage preference rÿi;mi of the alternatives in the subset below. Thus, Max fCi;mg
is a criterion for the subset of most preferred alternatives at the top of the
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preferred set. In the case of multiple optimum, the largest optimal m value is
selected.
In other words, the alternatives that are situated above this second cut-o
point are considered most preferred. It is assumed that the decision maker
would be reluctant to drop these alternatives. In a situation of complete in-
dierence, all Ci;mi  1 are maximum and we would set mi pi .
Phase 3: The intersection operation. Given all individual subsets of mi (most
preferred) alternatives, an intersection operation can be performed to identify
possible consensus solution(s). Similarly, an intersection operation can be
performed on individual subsets of pi (less preferred) alternatives.
3.2. Breaking the intersection impasse
The above has proved to be useful, since it partially captured the human
behavior in group decision making (Bui, 1987). If each decision maker selects
his own mi and deletes all the others, then there might be no common alter-
native in every decision maker’s most preferred set mi . That is,
m1 \ m2 . . . mdÿ1 \ md  ;; 7
where d is the number of decision makers. In other words, the most preferred
alternatives have an empty intersection. To overcome this diculty, we pro-
pose the following two procedures.
Procedure 1. Procedure 1 is an iterative process. In every iteration, it removes
the alternatives that have the least possibilities to be accepted as candidates.
That is, if no common alternative is identified in every decision maker’s most
preferred set, then the alternatives that fall in the least preferred set, pi , will be
removed and the preferences distribution will be reallocated to the left-over
alternatives in the more preferred set pi .
In every iteration, the procedure recalculates rij, SIij and Ci;m to find the new
cut-o points to divide the n into pi and nÿ pi and to divide the pi into mi and
p ÿ mi . This procedure continues until a common alternative(s) is identified in
every decision maker’s most preferred set mi . This procedure assumes that the
preference distribution is indierent to the removal of the least preferred al-
ternatives. There is no general guarantee that this procedure will lead to a
consensus.
Procedure 2. Procedure 2 diers from procedure 1 in that it expands the size of
the most preferred set downward until an alternative is identified in every
decision maker’s most preferred set. The length of the procedure depends on
the distribution of preferences. If the allocations do not deviate widely, it takes
only two steps to reach the solution. Otherwise, it takes the whole procedure
(four steps discussed below).
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which are the upper and lower limits of Cij for j  mi  1; . . . ; pi .
Step 2. For each decision maker i and value t 2 0; 1, identify mit, which is
the largest value of j, such that
Cij P Ci;max ÿ t  Ci;max ÿ Ci;min: 9
These steps represent the fact that because the decision makers cannot find
an alternative that appears in everyone’s most preferred set, they have to
further expand the size of the most preferred set by including part of the al-
ternatives in the less preferred set until alternative pi . Then the smallest value
of t is selected such that the decision makers have at least one common al-
ternative of all expanded most preferred sets, and anyone of the common al-
ternatives can be accepted as the solution.
The application of the above two steps will always give a solution unless
there is no common alternative in the preferred sets of the decision makers. In
such case the preferred sets should be expanded again before applying the
above procedure. The expansion can be done in the following way:








Step 4. For each decision maker i and value t 2 0; 1, calculate pit, which is
the largest value of j, such that
SIij6 SIi;min  t  SIi;max ÿ SIi;min: 11
The smallest value of t is selected such that the expanded preferred alter-
native sets have at least one common element. Steps 1 and 2 are then used with
the expanded preferred alternative sets.
4. Theorems and proofs
In this section, we provide theorems to address the extreme conditions of the
heuristics we proposed.
Theorem 1. For all j, SIij P 1=j, and equality holds if and only if ri1  ri2 
    rij:
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1Rij ÿ Ri1 
Ri2jÿ 2
2Rij ÿ Ri2     
Rijÿ1
jÿ 1Rij ÿ Rijÿ1
 
:
Notice for the general term k  1; 2; . . . ; jÿ 1,
Rikjÿ k








kjÿ krik  1;
and equality holds if and only if ri1  ri2      rij. The statement follows
immediately from this observation. 
Remark. The case ri1  ri2      rij is called the ‘‘most equilibrium’’
condition, when the decision maker cannot distinguish among the alternatives.
In our next theorem we show that there is no general upper bound for the
values of SIij.








































Corollary 1. If the ak values are large enough that the SIij value can be arbitrarily
large. That is, they are not bounded in general.
Corollary 2. Since the alternatives are ordered in decreasing ranking, rik P rik1.
Therefore ak  1 is always an appropriate selection, and so M ji P 1 and
SIij P 1=jjÿ 1jÿ 1  1=j. Hence Theorem 2 is a straightforward gener-
alization of Theorem 1.
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To search for another cut-o point to divide the preferred set into the most




The cut-o point is selected where Ci;mi is the maximum; that is, maxfCi;mg
for m  1; 2; . . . ; pi ÿ 1.
This step does not lead to less preferred solutions, if the Cij values are the
















It is easy to see that these equations hold if and only if for all











The values of ripi and ripi ÿ1 can be arbitrary, but Eq. (13) implies that all other
values ri1; ri2; . . . ; ripi ÿ2 are uniquely determined. If ripi ÿ1  ripi then it is easy to
see that ri1  ri2      ripi .
Consider next the special case when the utility values are assigned so that
ri1 > ri2 >    > ric > ric1  ric2      rin  0:
This case can be considered as a ‘‘maximum disequilibrium’’, when the decision
maker assigns all his preferences to some alternatives, and totally ignores the
others. In this case SIij  1 for j P c 1, since the denominator in Eq. (4)
becomes zero for c6 k < j.
In many situations, a decision maker would like to divide the alternatives
into two groups: preferred and less preferred, and assign the same preference to
all the alternatives in the same group. That is, if there are c alternatives that are
preferred more by the decision maker and each receives a higher preference:
ri1  ri2      ric  rih, then there are nÿ c of less preferred alternatives and
each receives a lower preference: ric1  ric2      rin  ril, where rih > ril.
The continuity of the SIij values and Theorem 1 imply that if the dierence
rih ÿ ril is small enough, then
SIi1 > SIi2 >    > SIin;
that is, the expansion operation does not reduce the alternative set. If the
dierence rih ÿ ril is large enough, then pi  c. That is, the preferred set co-
incides with the set of alternatives with single utility values. To prove the as-
sertion, consider first the case of ril  0. If j6 c, then
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kRij ÿ Rik 
1






If j P c 1, then
SIij  1;
since at least one denominator in Eq. (4) equals zero. Hence the minimal value
occurs at j  c. The continuity of SIij implies that the same j value is optimal
for small enough values of ril.
There is a special situation in which a decision maker allocates his prefer-
ences according to an algebraic sequence:
rij  rijÿ1 ÿ d; or rij  nÿ j 1d;
where j  1; 2; . . . ; n. In such condition ri1  nd, ri2  nÿ 1d; . . . , rin  d,
and nn 1=2d  1:0. That is, all the preferences are allocated like a ÿ45-
degree line pointing downward. The cumulative preferences can be written as
follows:





























2nÿ jÿ 1 ÿ k  j






2nÿ jÿ 1 ÿ k
 
 1













2nÿ jÿ k  1 :
We are unable to solve the optimal j in closed form, so we used simple
enumeration. The results are shown in Table 1. The results show that for j 
7
10
n the SIij is always the minimum. Therefore, j  0:7n is a good cut-o point
to divide n into the preferred set and the rest. For n > 10, the dierences among
SIi;pi ÿ1, SIi;pi and SIi;pi 1 become very small, for example, at n  20. Therefore,
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for this particular distribution of rij the best usage of the heuristic is recom-
mended to be n6 15.
To further divide the preferred set into the most preferred set and the less
preferred set, if we use Ci;mi , for this particular case, m

i  pi ÿ 1, and therefore
the most preferred alternative set contains pi ÿ 1 alternatives, and the less
preferred set contains only one alternative. Therefore we have to use SIij again.
However, the preferences rij for the most preferred alternatives need to be
renormalized as discussed in Section 3. That is, now the total preference, 1:0, of
decision maker i must be redistributed to pi alternatives instead of n. This step
is needed, since part of the original preference has been allocated to the other
alternatives, so the total preference that can be allocated to the less preferred
set is less than 1:0.
Table 2 provides the values of pi and m

i based on dierent n values. From
Table 2 we know that if n  10, pi  7, mi  5, And the less preferred set
consists of only two alternatives. The rest belongs to the least preferred set.
5. NAI as a tool for group decision and negotiation support
In this section, we provide an example of using the NAI heuristic in solving
a real-world problem. The example presented here is a simplified description of
a real-life application of the NAI heuristic (a more detailed discussion of the
case is given by Jacquet-Lagreze and Shakun, 1988). It demonstrates the ability
of the heuristic to enlarge the decision set and consequently, reduce the conflict
caused by individual dierences.
A group of four decision makers: three department heads and the company
president. They worked together to design a new product for the ultralight
Table 1
Relationship between n and pi
n p SIi;pÿ1 SIi;p SIi;p1
3 3 0.75 0.75
4 3 0.666 0.558 0.611
5 4 0.488 0.455 0.521
6 5 0.394 0.389 0.457
7 5 0.362 0.336 0.343
8 6 0.307 0.296 0.309
9 7 0.268 0.266 0.281
10 7 0.251 0.241 0.242
15 11 0.164 0.163 0.165
20 14 0.125 0.123 0.124
30 21 0.0833 0.0829 0.0830
40 28 0.0626 0.0624 0.0625
50 35 0.0502 0.0501 0.0502
100 70 0.0198 0.0197 0.0198
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airplane market. Player P1 is Marketing, Player P2 is Engineering, Player P3 is
Finance, and Player P4 is the company president.
They have identified six alternatives: A, B, C, D, E and F. The players used
two computer programs to perform their group decision making. A multi-at-
tribute utility model (Jacquet-Lagreze, 1985) that is based on a piece-wise
linear additive utility method was used to derive individual utilities (see
Table 3). Second, we developed a simple program to calculate the rij, SIij and
Ci;m to determine the locations of the cut-o points.
Table 4 shows the individual normalized utilities as rij, where
Pn
j1 rij  1,
SIij and Ci;m for each player. The cut-o point defining the preferred set of
alternatives for a given player is based on minSIij, as discussed in Section 3,
and is indicated by an asterisk (*) in the SIij for that player. Similarly, an as-
terisk (*) in the Ci;mi for each player indicates the most preferred set which is
based on maxCi;m .
Table 2
Selections of pi and m

i
n p m SIi;mÿ1 SIi;m
3 3 2 1.0 1.0
4 3 2 1.0 1.0
5 4 3 0.75 0.75
6 5 4 0.666 0.558
7 5 4 0.666 0.558
8 6 5 0.488 0.455
9 7 5 0.488 0.455
10 7 5 0.488 0.455
15 11 8 0.307 0.296
20 14 10 0.177 0.174
30 21 15 0.118 0.117
40 28 20 0.0889 0.0886
50 35 25 0.0713 0.0714
100 70 50 0.0359 0.0358
Table 3
Utilities of players for six alternatives
Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 Player 4
Alt. Util. Alt. Util. Alt. Util. Alt. Util.
E 0.77 F 0.67 D 0.71 E 0.77
F 0.69 E 0.58 B 0.57 F 0.71
C 0.53 A 0.43 E 0.57 B 0.39
D 0.47 D 0.42 F 0.55 C 0.34
B 0.44 B 0.35 C 0.39 D 0.27
A 0.02 C 0.29 A 0.29 A 0.13
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Given the individual player preferred sets we find, in the first trial, by in-
tersection, the NAI heuristic has identified B, C, D, E and F as preferred ne-
gotiable alternatives for the group. Alternative A is a negligible alternative
which can be dropped from further consideration. However, since no alter-
native appears in every one’s most preferred set, we have to use the procedures
as discussed at the end of Section 3 to search for a solution. We first discuss
Procedure 1.
Procedure 1. Procedure 1 suggests that we drop alternative A and make
another trial. We obtain Table 5, which shows alternative E as the most
preferred while alternatives B, C, D and F are less preferred. Evidently,
airplane E is a good candidate for the group’s new product. Also from earlier
literature (Jacquet-Lagreze and Shakun, 1988), we note that airplane E is also
the max/min solution to the group decision problem.
Procedure 2. The first step in Procedure 2 uses Eq. (8) to find the values of Ci;min
and Ci;max of the less preferred set. The second step uses Eq. (9) to expand the
Table 4
The first NAI trial
Player Alt. rij SIij Ci;m
1 E 0.26 ÿ 1.45*
F 0.24 0.56 1.44
C 0.18 0.44 1.16
D 0.16 0.35 1.07
B 0.15 0.29* ÿ
A 0.01 ÿ 1.25
2 F 0.24 ÿ 1.62*
E 0.21 0.58 1.56
A 0.16 0.46 1.22
D 0.15 0.35 1.31
B 0.13 0.30 1.21
C 0.11 0.27* ÿ
3 D 0.23 ÿ 1.50
B 0.19 0.62 1.27
E 0.19 0.39 1.39
F 0.18 0.29 1.62*
C 0.13 0.27* 1.34
A 0.09 0.27* ÿ
4 E 0.30 ÿ 1.80
F 0.27 0.54 2.13*
B 0.15 0.55 1.28
C 0.13 0.46 1.26
D 0.10 0.41* ÿ
A 0.05 0.46 ÿ
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size of the most preferred set by taking some of the alternatives from the less
preferred set. We present the procedure and the results in Table 6.
It only took one step to obtain the solution–Alternative E. When some
decision makers are willing to give up their choices in the most preferred set
and to consider alternatives in the less preferred set, solution is much easier to
obtain. The solution was identified when each decision maker moved the first
alternative in the less preferred set into the most preferred set. That is, at t  0,
Table 6
The alternative search by procedure 2





0.0 Player 1 1.07 1.44 1.44 EF
Player 2 1.21 1.56 1.56 FE
Player 3 1.34 1.34 1.34 DBEFC
Player 4 1.26 1.28 1.28 EFB
Table 5
The second NAI trial
Player Alt. rij SIij Ci;m
1 E 0.27 ÿ 1.45
F 0.24 0.56 1.44
C 0.18 0.44 1.16
D 0.16 0.35 1.07
B 0.15 0.29 ÿ
2 F 0.29 ÿ 1.63
E 0.25 0.58 1.64
D 0.18 0.47 1.31
B 0.15 0.39 1.21
B 0.13 0.34 ÿ
3 D 0.25 ÿ 1.37
B 0.20 0.62 1.13
E 0.20 0.39 1.21
F 0.20 0.29 1.41
C 0.14 0.27 ÿ
4 E 0.31 ÿ 1.80
F 0.29 0.54 2.13
B 0.16 0.55 1.28
C 0.14 0.46 1.26
D 0.11 0.41 ÿ
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the first alternative was moved. This example is a special case in that it took
only one step to obtain the solution. Solution E is the same as the one obtained
in Procedure 1.
6. Summary
Recent studies in social choice continue to challenge the eciency of voting
systems (e.g., Benoit and Kornhauser, 1994). Extending Arrow’s pioneering
work (Arrow, 1951), many authors argue that searching for a common solution
based on the maximal element of an ordering simply violates the concept of
justice (Anscombe, 1976; Knight and Johnson, 1994; Kolm, 1994). Instead, we
argue that there is a need for deliberative procedures that help (i) search for
social consensus, and when they fail, (ii) identify disconcerting, perhaps in-
surmountable, diculties as a basis for problem re-definition.
We have proposed a formalized heuristic for consensus seeking in a single
voting context, the Negotiable Alternatives Identifier (NAI). NAI first seeks to
locate candidates for compromise, and next searches for a collective solution.
This algorithm contributes to the literature of social choice and reasoning in
two areas. First, the reasoning in this paper is a further evidence of the im-
portance of using a complete asymmetry preorder for expressing preferences
over a set of alternatives. Second, the NAI algorithm, especially with its ex-
pansion/contraction/intersection concept, provides an aggregation approach
which is less rigid yet intuitive enough for the decision makers to search for,
and agree upon, a group solution. A limitation of the NAI heuristic resides in
the fact that it operates on a given set of cardinal distribution. One can argue,
however, that if impasse is shown to be unavoidable, then voters are at
least ‘‘confirmed’’ by NAI, and encouraged to search for more creative
settlement.
The NAI consensus-seeking heuristics has been integrated into Co-op, a
decision support system for group multi-criteria decision making on a network
of personal computers. From its use in real world cases, NAI has proven to be
helpful in supporting group consensus seeking.
References
Anscombe, G.E., 1976. On frustration of the majority by fulfillment of the majority’s will. Analysis
36, 161–168.
Arrow, K.J., 1951. Social Choice and Individual Values. Wiley, New York.
Benoit, J.-P., Kornhauser, L., 1994. Social choice in a representative democracy. American Political
Science Review 88 (1), 185–192.
Black, D., 1958. The Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, MA.
J. Yen, T.X. Bui / Appl. Math. Comput. 104 (1999) 259–276 275
Borda, J.C., 1981. Memoire sur les elections au scrutin. Histoire de l’Academie Royale de Science,
Paris.
Bui, T., 1987. Co-oP: A decision support system for cooperative multiple criteria group decision
making. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer, New York, 1986.
Bui, T., Shakun, M.F., 1989. The negotiable alternatives identifier (NAI): A consensus seeking
heuristics for group decision and negotiation support systems. SCIMA 18 (1–2), 15–24.
Cook, W.E., Seiford, L.M., 1978. Priority ranking and consensus formation. Management Science
28 (6), 621–627.
Fishburn, P.C., 1974a. Lexicographic orders, utilities and decision rules. Management Science 20
(11), 142–1471.
Fishburn, P.C., 1974b. On the sum-of-the-ranks winner when losers are removed. Discrete
Mathematics 8, 25–30.
Hackman, J.R., Kaplan, R.E., 1974. Interventions into group process: An approach to improving
the eectiveness of groups. Decision Sciences 5, 459–480.
Holsapple, C.W., Lai, H., Whinston, A.B., 1996. Implications of negotiation theory for research
and development of negotiation support systems. Group Decision and Negotiation 6 (3), 255–
274.
Hwang, C.-L., Lin, M.J., 1987. Group decision making under multiple criteria. Lectures Notes in
Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol. 281. Springer, Berlin.
Jacquet-Lagreze, E., 1985. PREFCALC, Version 2.0, Euro-Decision, B.P. 57, 78530 Buc, France.
Jacquet-Lagreze, E., Shakun, M.F., 1988. Using MEDIATOR for New Product Design and
Negotiation. In: Shakun.
Knight, J., Johnson, J., 1994. Aggregation and deliberation: On the possibility of democratic
legitimacy. Political Theory 22 (2), 277–296.
Kolm, S.-C., 1994. Rational normative economics vs social welfare and social choice. European
Economic Review 38 (3–4), 721–730.
Lax, D.A., Sebenius, J.K., 1986. The Manager as Negotiator: Bargaining for Cooperation and
Competitive Gain. Free Press, New York.
Mumpower, J.L., Rohrbaugh, J., 1996. Negotiation and design: Supporting resource allocation
decisions through analytical mediation. Group Decision and Negotiation 5, 385–409.
Pinson, S., Moraitis, P., 1996. An intelligent distributed system for strategic decision making.
Group Decision and Negotiation 6, 77–108.
Reeves, G.R., Bordetski, A., 1995. A framework for interactive multiple criteria group decision
support. Group Decision and Negotiation 4, 107–115.
Saaty, T.L., 1980. The Analytic Hierarchy Process. McGraw-Hill, New York.
Shakun, M.F., 1988. Evolutionary Systems Design: Policy Making under Complexity and Group
Decision Support Systems. Holden-Day, Oakland, CA.
Shakun, M.F., 1991. Airline buyout: Evolutionary systems design and problem restructuring in
group decision and negotiation. Management Science 37 (10), 1291–1303.
Zarhman, I.W., 1994. International Multilateral Negotiation: Approaches to the Management of
Complexity. Jossey-Bass, San Franscisco, CA.
276 J. Yen, T.X. Bui / Appl. Math. Comput. 104 (1999) 259–276
